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Plato and the Norms of Thought Mind Oxford Academic

IntroductionPlato on ThinkingThinking Ancient and ModernThinking in The TheaetetusThought and BeliefQuestions of ScopeThought and FalsehoodThe Objects of EnquiryRecollection and The Objects of ThoughtRepresentation and The Objects of ThoughtI would like to discuss some aspects of Plato’s conception of thinking and in particular to investigate what he supposes is required for a subject to be thinking of a given object The topic falls in modern parlance under the rubric of intentionality1though to avoid prejudice to either Platonic or modern conceptions I shall largely steer clear of that term I shall argue that Plato upholds a demanding view of what such thinking requires which I label the ‘transparency view’ In brief that stands for the following necessary condition if a thought is to be of a given object that object must be represented by the subject just as it is complete and accurate without omission or distortion To give an intuitive sense of what this means if in attempting to think of Socrates who has (let us say) blue eyes I represent someone with green eyes or eyes of no determinate colour then I am not thinking of Socrates if in attempting to think of a pig pigs having curly tails I repr Our startingpoint is the famous account of thinking (dianoeisthai) at Theaetetus 189e–190a where Socrates describes it as speech (logos) which the soul has with itself2 Thinking is portrayed as a rather careful process The soul ‘questions and answers itself’ on the topics under consideration before making a judgement (doxa) the latter also characterized as silent speech Now the context in which this account of thinking occurs is Socrates’ discussion of the difficulties of explaining how falsejudgement is possible The account is embedded in and apparently intended to serve the argument that it is impossible to think of a thing (if one is to be thinking of it at all) as anything other than the thing that it is which causes the socalled ‘otherjudging’ theory of false judgement to run into trouble I cannot falsely judge yonder cow to be a horse given that I am ‘grasping both [cow and horse] with my soul’ (190c67) since I need to be grasping a cow for it to be the case th On something like a modern or ‘folk’ view of the matter I take it that there will not be a great difference between attempting to think of a given object and succeeding Thus in contrast to what I consider to be Plato’s conception though one may talk of success there is not generally a notion of failure to compare it with If you ask me to try to think of an elephant for example and I affirm sincerely that I am thinking of an elephant then that is generally taken as sufficient for it to be the case that I am thinking of an elephant I might of course not be familiar with the term ‘elephant’ — but then it makes little sense to say that I was even trying to think of one One may likewise doubt that the thought could so much as be attempted if I had only a limited familiarity with the term perhaps merely aware that it referred to some animal or other Alternatively I might have some peculiar mental block whereby I am quite familiar with the term but am simply unable say to Plato no sentimentalist about such matters does not offer reliance on vicarious expertise as a means of granting the nonexpert subject successful thought At its strictest his conception of what it is to be thinking of an object is that one must oneself be representing it just as it is I have termed this the Transparency View (or TV) To revisit our earlier example if Socrates has blue eyes and what I represent in my thought is someone with green eyes or eyes of no determinate colour then I am not thinking of Socrates Why not? To get more closely to grips with this idea let us examine the passage in Plato where TV is most clearly stated Theaetetus 209b–c Socrates is mounting a critique of the third and final version of the proposal that knowledge is true judgement with an account ‘account’ (logos) now construed as the expression of a thing’s distinguishing mark Socrates argues against this version that Theaetetus will not even be an object of one’s judgement unles There is a causal condition also operative in the dialogue’s famous ‘jury’ passage which had argued that knowledge is different from true judgement or belief The courtroom lawyer’s persuasive speech is said in a phrase similar to that later found at 209c10 to cause the jury to judge the truth (cf doxazein poiountes 201a9 doxasai poiēsai b6) whereas it is only an eyewitness who can have knowledge The jury that is lack a necessary condition for knowledge that the eyewitness possesses which given the causal vocabulary and the later echo is plausibly construed as being that knowledge must be caused by its proper object in this instance the events in question The echo of the jury in the exposition of 209c indicates at the same time a key difference between the two passages By 209c the stamping of a thing’s features on one’s mind is needed for one to have so much as true belief about that thing The jury passage implicitly takes this as a requirement only for knowledg The notion of stamping does however suggest that only intrinsic features of the item in question and among these only its external features need be represented for TV to be satisfied This seems a reasonable constraint when it comes to thinking of perceptible objects though it should be noted that the Wax Tablet model does not restrict the source of impressions to what is perceptible (191d6–7 195a5–6) only that falsehood is to be explained by mismatch of perception to impression Indeed Theodorus had earlier picked out Theaetetus as possessing a unique combination of intellectual and moral gifts (144a–b) suggesting at least in the case of persons an alternative route to individuation As to the intrinsic its scope is murky and in the Platonic scheme some features that one might regard as relational may be included25 Thus a thing’s being taller than another is on occasion considered to be analysable as that thing having tallness compared to the shortness in the other (P To see first how TV might be doing further work in the Theaetetus itself recall that a significant portion of the dialogue (187d–200d) is occupied with the question of how it is that we can go wrong in our thinking — how false belief or judgement is possible At 188a–c Socrates argues that whether I know two things x and y or not I can never mistake one for the other given that if I know a thing I cannot think it is anything else and if I do not know it I cannot so much as have it as an object of my thought in the first place such that I could then go on to make a mistake about it One may protest that Socrates presents a false dichotomy — surely I can know Socrates and still make mistakes about him I can know Socrates without having everything about him right28 But it follows from TV that if I know Socrates then I do have all his features right getting something about him wrong would mean that it was indeed not him I have in mind and therefore (a fortiori) not him tha Let us now consider a better known Platonic passage but one which has obvious structural affinities with the puzzle about knowing and notknowing in the Theaetetus36 namely the paradox of enquiry at Meno 80d–e often dubbed ‘Meno’s paradox’ This paradox too it is tempting to claim betrays a false dichotomy between total knowledge and blank ignorance37 It states in Socrates’ reformulation (80e2–5) that if I know a thing there is no need to seek it if I do not know it then I cannot seek it because I do not know what it is I am looking for Then it may be said among other things that the second limb of the dilemma will hold only if I know nothing about my object of enquiry an objection positively invited by Meno’s original formulation which talks of the wouldbe enquirer being unable to search when not knowing the object ‘at all’ (to parapan 80d6 cf b4) this in turn picking up Socrates’ claim at the start of the dialogue not to know ‘at all’ what virtue is (71b3) Mayb More explicitly than the Meno the Recollection Argument (RA) of the Phaedo concerns itself with the conditions for thinking of an object A good deal of scholarly discussion has centred on exactly what sort of cognition the argument is intended to account for Is it the humdrum grasp that any regular human has of concepts such as equality or justice? Or is it the higherlevel grasp striven for by experts — philosophers as Plato would have it — manifested in the ability to give accounts or definitions of such concepts?39 These alternatives throw up some interesting parallels with what I have described as differences between modern and Platonic views of thinking Since Plato considers that items such as justice are real objects standardly termed (by scholars more than by Plato himself) Forms the question boils down to how stringent are the conditions that he thinks need to hold in order for it to be true that a subject is getting in mind a given object Can an ordinary person wit If one presses hard enough it may seem that what one will turn out to be doing on this reading no less than on the one I have rejected is to notice not whether but that the likeness falls short for one may be sceptical about whether any painting say could be a faithful enough likeness to survive scrutiny on these terms Imperfection however slight will be registered by one who has the appropriately lucid recall In that case my reading will fail on the very point that was supposed to motivate it Elsewhere however Socrates offers a view of what makes a good likeness that is tough but not absurd At Cratylus 431c the painter who depicts ‘all the appropriate colours and shapes’ of the original is said to produce a good likeness whereas one who adds subtracts or presents a feature of disproportionate size fails to do so If that is Socrates’ view then we may take him to regard it as possible that a painter produce a likeness that is not liable to be found wanting On th Author Raphael WoolfCited by Publish Year 2013.

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